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Abstract: We study how human preferences aect the resilience of economies that
depend on more than one type of natural resources. In particular, we analyze whether
the degree of substitutability of natural resources in consumer needs may give rise to
multiple steady states and path dependence even when resources are managed opti-
mally. This is a major shift in the interpretation and analysis of resilience, from viewing
(limited) resilience as an objective property of the economy-environment system to ac-
knowledging its partially subjective, preference-based character. We nd that society
tends to be less willing to buer exogenous shocks if resource goods are complements
in consumption than if they are substitutes. Hence, the stronger the complementarity
between the various types of resource goods, the less resilient the economy is.
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Resilience is typically viewed as a property of natural systems and is dened as the
extent to which they can buer exogenous shocks [1]. Natural systems, whether they
are ecosystems, species populations or climate systems, tend to be robust to small
perturbations. But if shocks are large enough that a system crosses a threshold or tipping
point, its dynamics may be such that it collapses to an undesired state. Examples of
natural systems characterized by limited resilience include populations with a minimum
population size below which extinction is inevitable (e.g., [2, 3, 4]), ecological systems
with complex interactions between the various components of the system such as shallow
lakes and semi-arid rangelands (e.g., [5, 6]), and the Earth's climate system, where events
like melting of the Greenland ice sheet or of the permafrost in the Northern Hemisphere
might cause the Earth's climate to change dramatically (e.g., [7, 8, 9]).
The extent to which a natural system is resilient against exogenous shocks is not
just a function of the underlying ecological processes; it also crucially depends on the
way in which the system is managed. An example in point is the stock of cod in the
North-East Arctic which collapsed in the late 1980s due to very high harvesting pressure
combined with a sudden shortage of its main prey species, capelin [10]. Poorly managed
natural resource systems, including so-called open-access resources, are generally less
resilient to shocks than optimally managed systems. This does not mean, however,
that optimally managed systems never collapse. Optimal policy making in an uncertain
world requires comparing the benets and costs of pre-shock precaution and post-shock
system restoration { if restoration is physically possible at all. Hence, resilience is not
just an intrinsic feature of natural resources; institutions and preferences are likely to
play an important role, too [11].
In this paper, we explore the impact of human preferences on the resilience of op-
timally managed economies that depend on more than one type of renewable natural
1resource. We nd two characteristics of preferences to be of key importance. The rst is
{ not surprisingly { the discount rate used by the social planner. For a given amount of
time needed for natural resources to return to their good state in the wake of a negative
shock, system restoration is less likely to be optimal the higher the social discount rate
{ even if this leads to the demise of one or more resources. The second key characteristic
of preferences is more surprising: it is the extent to which the various types of natural
resources are substitutes or complements in the consumers' utility function. While intu-
ition would suggest that society's willingness to protect a natural resource from collapse
would be larger the more dependent it is on its output (that is, when natural resources
are complements rather than substitutes in consumption), we nd the exact opposite.
The reason is that if restoring the resource requires a moratorium on its exploitation, it
is less costly to do so if there are good substitutes available so that postponing exploiting
the resource does not reduce consumer welfare by much. While we pay most attention
to the impact of the discount rate and the degree of complementarity in resource con-
sumption on the resilience of the resource-dependent economy, we analyze the impact of
other factors too, including the rate of resource regeneration and the opportunity costs
of harvesting.
Over the past decade, many papers have tried to provide explanations for the collapse
of historic societies as diverse as those of Easter Island, the Anasazi, and the Maya [12],
as better insights into the fate of previous civilizations may help the current one to better
cope with today's major environmental crises such as climate change or biodiversity loss
[13, 14]. For example, Taylor [14] and Brander and Taylor [15] develop models to explain
the disappearance of the civilization on Easter Island, suggesting that its demise may
have been due to a nonlinear interaction between population growth and the dynamics
of natural resources, especially forest resources, resulting in feast-and-famine cycles.
While lack of property rights and myopia are most likely the underlying causes of the
collapse of the Easter Island civilization, our paper suggests that depletion of the forest
2resource is not necessarily suboptimal. To feed the population, sh need to be caught,
and hence trees need to be logged continuously to produce boats. Timber consumption
and catching sh are thus complements, and the instantaneous costs of reduced shing
activity to restore forest stocks may have been too large compared to the long-run
benets of recovered timber resources.
Modern society is admittedly much more complex than that of Easter Island, but
our model still provides important insights for the challenges we face today. For ex-
ample, because good substitutes are scarcer the higher the level of physical aggregation
(e.g., protein intake from wild deer can easily be replaced by farmed beef, but no good
substitutes are available for the Earth's climate system), dealing with the large-scale en-
vironmental challenges posed today may even be more dicult than previously thought.
Our results have important implications for sustainable resource policy especially when
natural resources are complements in consumption, as it is obviously the case for e.g.
clean drinking water and fertile soil which is needed for food production. Our analysis
sheds light on the circumstances under which exogenous temporary negative shocks,
e.g. storms, oods or other hazards,1 may eventually lead to resource depletion. It also
sheds light on the optimal management of the resource system before it is hit by such a
shock.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a stylized model of an
economy that depends on the use of two types of renewable natural resources. In sec-
tion 3, we derive the conditions for dynamically optimal resource use. In section 4, we
use this information to analyze the steady states and path dependence of the resource-
dependent economy. In particular, we study how the number of optimal steady states
and their stability properties depend on the degree of complementarity of the two re-
1Here we focus on the impact of exogenous shocks on the level of individual resource stocks, assuming
that their dynamic properties are unaected. For an analysis of the case in which climate change aects
resource regeneration functions, see [16].
3sources in consumption and on the social discount rate, providing both analytical results
and numerical examples. We use the results to determine the consequences for optimal
resilience management of a resource-dependent economy in section 5, taking into ac-
count the possibility that the stocks may be hit by a negative shock. We conclude by
discussing the implications of our model for the management of global natural resources
in section 6.
2 Model of a natural-resource-dependent economy
Consider a representative agent who derives utility from the consumption of a (compos-
ite) manufactured good, y(t), and from the consumed quantities of two dierent natural
resource goods, h1(t) and h2(t). The agent's instantaneous utility function is specied
as









where  > 0 is the weight the agent attaches to consumption of natural resources, and
1= is the elasticity of substitution between the two natural resource goods.
The quasi-linear utility function (1) captures some stylized facts about preferences
on natural resources and manufactured goods. Natural resources typically satisfy basic
needs. This is captured by equation (1) because marginal utility goes to innity (zero)
as the consumption of resources goes to zero (innity). Marginal utility of the man-
ufactured good, in contrast, is constant. Hence, this good is not essential: marginal
utility does not go to innity as consumption goes to zero. Next, utility function (1) is
exible in that it allows the two natural resource goods to be complements in consump-
tion or substitutes, depending on the value of . Resources are perfect substitutes in
consumption if  ! 0 and perfect complements if  ! 1, with  = 1 as the special case
where the sub-utility from resource consumption is the Cobb-Douglas function. Hence,
 measures the degree of complementarity of the two resource goods in consumption:
4the higher , the stronger the complementarity between the two. Finally, note that in
case  > 1, depletion of one or more resources (implying that h1(t) and/or h2(t) equals
zero) results in instantaneous utility being equal to minus innity. This suggests that it
is never optimal to deplete either resource in nite time { but see section 4.
The representative agent inelastically supplies one unit of labor on a competitive
labor market. Labor is allocated between the three activities of producing the manu-
factured good, y, and harvesting of the two natural resource stocks to produce resource
goods, h1 and h2. We assume that all markets always clear, so that quantities con-
sumed of each of the three commodities equal the quantities supplied. Regarding the
production of the manufactured good, we assume that the quantity produced is a linear
function of just one input, labor, with constant marginal productivity equal to ! > 0.
Using e1(t) and e2(t) to denote eort allocated to respectively harvesting of resource










Normalizing the sales price of the manufactured good to unity, linearity of the manu-
facturing production function (2) implies that the general equilibrium wage rate equals
! { as long as manufacturing is still taking place. To ensure that this is the case, we
assume that ! >  (see Appendix A.1), that is, the marginal product of manufacturing
should be larger than the weight the representative agent attaches to the consumption
of natural resource goods.
Regarding the natural resource sectors, we assume that resource goods are harvested
according to the standard Schaefer function [17, 18]:
hj(t) = qj xj(t)ej(t); j = 1;2; (3)
where xj(t) is the size of the resource stock j at time t, and qj is a technology parameter
reecting what share of the resource stock j can be harvested per unit of eort. Note
5that the marginal product of labor, ej(t), allocated to harvesting resource j is larger the
larger the size of the resource stock, xj(t).
Regarding the dynamics of the resource stocks, current harvesting hj(t) reduces the
remaining stock xj(t), but there is also natural regeneration. The change in the stock
size of resource j at time t, _ xj(t)  dxj(t)=dt, equals the net natural growth of the
resource stock, fj(xj(t)), minus the quantity harvested;hj(t):
_ xj(t) = fj(xj(t))   hj(t); j = 1;2; (4)
where we assume that both resources regenerate according to the standard logistic
growth function [19]:2






; j = 1;2: (5)
Here rj denotes the intrinsic (or maximum) growth rate of resource j, and Kj its carrying
capacity (or the maximum stock the ecosystem can sustain). Substituting (5) into (4),
our model implies that net natural growth of resource j is a function of just the size of
its stock and of the rate at which it is being harvested { there is no physical interaction
between the two resource stocks. We thus assume that the only interaction between the
two is via consumer preferences (see also [20, 21, 22, 23]).





  t dt; (6)
where  > 0 is the social discount rate. This discount rate is assumed to reect the
representative household's impatience to consume, but possibly also the limited perma-
2We assume resource regeneration to be subject to logistic growth, and hence we do not impose
any inherent non-linearities in their regeneration. Hence, we abstract from \regime shifts" within the
resource system (but see [16]). Moreover, we would like to note that our qualitative results do not
depend on the specic form (5). Similar results can be obtained for other specications of fj(xj).
6nence of society's institutions. With a positive probability, the current institutions may
cease to exist at any given point in time by forces beyond the planner's control.
To maximize (6), the social planner chooses the quantity harvested of each of the two
resources, h1(t) and h2(t), in every period as well as the amount of the manufactured
good produced, y(t), taking into account constraints (1){(5) as well as the initial stock
sizes (xj(0) = xj0;j = 1;2).3
3 Conditions for optimal resource use
The conditions for dynamically optimal resource use are derived as the necessary rst-
order conditions for the social planner's maximization problem. In the following, we use
j to denote the shadow price of consuming resource j. This shadow price is equal to
the direct marginal costs of harvesting, i.e., the cost of eort needed to harvest an extra
unit of resource j, plus the opportunity costs of reducing the current resource stock with
one unit, which are given by the shadow price of the stock of resource j, j.
Using (4) and the conditions for optimal resource (see Appendix A.1), we obtain the
following system of dierential equations (i;j = 1;2;j 6= i):



























that governs the optimal dynamics of the resource-dependent economy together with
the initial conditions, xj(0) = xj0, and the transversality conditions, e  t j xj
t!1       ! 0,
for both resources j = 1;2. The interaction between the two resources is captured by
the harvesting term in equation (7). Equation (8), in contrast, depends only on the
stock and shadow price of the resource j = 1;2 itself.
3 From here on, we omit the time indicators, unless it may cause confusion to do so.
7The resilience of the resource-dependent economy is determined by the number of
optimal steady states, and their stability properties. A steady state is characterized
by _ x1 = _ x2 = 0 and _ 1 = _ 2 = 0. Using these conditions in (7) and (8) we obtain (for






















Note that in equation (10) the shadow price of consuming resource j is just a function
of the size of stock j, while the interaction between the two resources is captured in






















































Together, equations (11) and (12) give the optimal steady-state stock xj of resource j
as a function of the steady-state stock xi of resource i, the xj(xi)-isocline.
4 Steady states and path dependence of optimal re-
source management
To be able to derive clear-cut analytical results, we assume in the following that the
two natural resources are governed by the same dynamic processes. That is, the pa-
rameters of the biological growth functions are the same, and so are the parameters of
the harvesting functions: r1 = r2 = r, K1 = K2 = 1, and q1 = q2 = q. Furthermore,
8because (x1;x2) = (0;0) is an absorbing state (see equation 5), we assume throughout
the analysis that at least one of the resource stocks is initially strictly positive.
We aim to analyze the number of steady states in the system, as well as their stability
properties. It is easy to show that under mild parameter conditions and assuming that
the two resource stocks are driven by the same dynamic processes, there always exists a
symmetric steady state in which the stocks of both resources are strictly positive. This
is stated more formally in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For symmetric resources, and if and only if max

2r!    q;r q   ( q  
2r!)
	





















Proof: see Appendix A.2. 
The resource stocks in the symmetric interior steady state do not depend on the
degree of complementarity, , as both resources are used in equal quantities. Of course,
the sizes of the resource stocks do depend on the social discount rate, : the higher the
discount rate, the smaller the optimal resource stocks. If the condition 2r! >  q is
met, however, the steady state stocks are positive even for  ! 1. Higher weights on
resource consumption (), higher harvesting productivities (q) and lower productivity
levels in manufacturing (!) make instantaneous resource harvesting more attractive {
especially if society does not care much about the future (i.e., if  ! 1). In that case,
stock depletion can still be avoided, but only if the intrinsic growth rate of the resource
(r) is suciently high.
We are interested in how the number of steady states depends on society's pref-
erences, including the degree of complementarity of resources in consumption. The
following proposition yields a rst result.
9Proposition 1. The symmetric steady state is locally stable independent of the degree
of complementarity  if either  q < r! or  < r2 !=(2 ( q   r!))  MSY .
Proof: see Appendix A.3. 
Combined with Lemma 1, Proposition 1 states that the steady-state level of xS is
independent of  if minfr!    q;MSY   g > 0. The reason is that if this condition is
met, the steady-state resource stock xS { as dened in (13) { is larger than the maximum
sustainable yield stock, xMSY.4 If  q < r!, demand for the resources (captured by )
and productivity of resource extraction (q) are so low relative to resource productivity
(r) and opportunity costs of harvesting (!) that even under full myopia ( ! 1, or
equivalently: open access) the symmetric steady-state stocks are larger than the stocks
that would generate the maximum sustainable yield (see Appendix A.2). If  q > r!,
one has xS = xMSY if  = r2 !=(2 ( q   r!))  MSY, and hence the symmetric steady-
state levels are smaller than xMSY if and only if minfr!    q;MSY   g > 0.
Lemma 1 states that there is no interior symmetric steady state if max

2r!  
 q;r q ( q 2r!)
	
< 0, and Proposition 1 states that if maxfr!    q;MSY   g >
0, the symmetric steady-state stocks are positive and stable independent of . Having
established these results, we now move on to analyzing the case where the symmetric
steady state is in the interior (because (xS
1;xS
2) = (0;0) is not very interesting if one
wants to study resilience), and where xS
j < xMSY (because the system is always perfectly
resilient if xS
j  xMSY). That means that for the rest of the paper we explore all cases
for which the following condition holds:
Condition 1: r! <  q < 2r! and  > MSY.
For all cases in which Condition 1 holds, the steady state stocks are in between 0
4 The maximum sustainable yield stock is the stock size at which the amount that can be harvested
without reducing the stock, is maximal. For any x harvesting is sustainable if hj  f(xj), and the
largest quantity that can be harvested sustainably is at the stock level where net resource regeneration
is largest. Solving f0(xj) = 0 and using the equation of motion (5), we have xMSY = K=2 = 1=2.
10and the maximum sustainable yield stock, and preferences may aect both the number
of steady states and their stability. Therefore, we now turn to analyzing the situations
in which resources are either substitutes (section 4.1) or complements (section 4.2) for
all cases in which Condition 1 is met.
4.1 Optimal dynamics when resources are substitutes
Let us now analyze the case where Condition 1 holds and where the degree of com-
plementarity of the two resources in consumption is such that they are substitutes in
consumption (i.e.,  < 1).
Proposition 2. When resources are substitutes ( < 1) the following holds.
2a. The system has three steady states if
 < r
 q
 q   ! r
 0 : (14)
the symmetric steady state (xS
1;xS
2) = (xS;xS) with xS > 0, and two asymmetric steady


















5 > 0: (15)
2b. Independent of (14), the symmetric steady state (xS;xS) is globally stable.5
Proof: see Appendix A.4. 
Any optimal steady state, whether or not we assume that resources are identical, is
determined by the solution of the xed-point equation x1(x2(x1)) = x1, where x1(x2)
and x2(x1) are determined by equations (11) and (12) (for i;j = 1;2 and j 6= i). When
resources are substitutes the isoclines are upward-sloping over the entire domain (see
Appendix A.4), and hence they only intersect once. These results are illustrated in
5By \global" we mean the entire state space, with the exception of the axes (x1;0) with x1  0 and
(0;x2) with x2  0 { which is a subset of measure zero in the entire state space.
11(a) (b)
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Figure 1: Phase diagrams for (a) low ( < 0) and (b) high ( > 0) social discount rates
for the case when resources are substitutes,  < 1.
Figure 1.6 Proposition 2 states that if  < 1, (xS;xS) is the only optimal steady state,
as the asymmetric ones are unstable. That means that xj = xA; x j = 0 is achieved
only if x j(0) = 0.
We will refer to the case where  < 0 (see 14) as the case of a low discount rate
and to  > 0 as the case of a high discount rate.7 Figure 1(a) shows the case of a low
discount rate, where there are two asymmetric steady states (xA;0) and (0;xA) with
xA > 0 (cf. Proposition 2). For the case of a high discount rate, shown in Figure 1(b),
(xS;xS) is the only non-trivial steady state. In short, if  < 1, the optimal steady state
stocks of both resources are strictly positive; corner solutions are only optimal if and
only if one of the two resource stocks is initially equal to zero.
6 For our numerical analyses that we use to construct all gures, we choose r = 0:04; ! = 0:1 and
q = 0:1. We set the weight of resources in utility at  = 0:0667 = 0:667!, which means that two thirds
of the available eort is spent harvesting resources. In Figure 1, we further use  = 0:05,  = 0:625 in
panel (a), and  = 0:17,  = 0:625 in panel (b).
7Subscript 0 in 0 refers to the result that xA = 0 for all  > 0 (cf. Proposition 2).
124.2 Optimal dynamics when resources are complements
Let us now check whether the interior steady state is still globally stable if the two
resource goods are relative complements in consumption,  > 1 (taking into account
Condition 1). Trivially, (0;0) is a steady state, and from Lemma 1 we know that there
always is an interior symmetric steady state ((xS
1;xS
2) = (xS;xS)). However, it is easy to
see that in case resources are complements, there are two additional asymmetric steady
states: (0;1) and (1;0). With  > 1 we have xj
t!1       ! 1 if x j(0) = 0: if one resource has
been depleted, harvesting the other one does not yield any utility, and hence the latter
stock grows to its carrying capacity (recall we set K = 1). Below we also prove that we
may also have xj
t!1       ! 1 if x j(0) is positive but close to zero, but only if the discount
rate is suciently high or the degree of complementarity suciently large. If this is the
case, (1,0) and (0,1) are locally stable and hence the economy does not necessarily end
up in (xS;xS):
Before we can state this formally in Proposition 3, we rst state two Lemmas:
Lemma 2. When resources are complements ( > 1), the symmetric interior steady
state is locally stable if  < ^ () and locally unstable if  > ^ (), where ^ () > 1 is
dened by






with (xS) = !
q xS
+r xS
 r+2r xS and xS is given by (13).
Proof: see Appendix A.5. 
We will refer to the case 1 <  < ^ () as the resources being mild complements and
to the case  > ^ () as the resources being strong complements.8
8 Note that because ^  is a function of  (because xS is a function of ), the denitions of mild and
strong complementarity depend on the level of the discount rate. A specic degree of complementarity,
, may be considered `mild' for some values of , and `strong' for others { depending on whether  is
smaller than ^ (), or not. We will come back to this at the end of this subsection.
13Lemma 2 indicates that the degree of complementarity may crucially aect the sta-
bility of steady states, including the symmetric one. We next use this result to derive
conditions under which other interior steady states exist and to characterize their re-
spective stability properties.
Lemma 3. When resources are complements ( > 1),
3a. for a low discount rate ( < 0) and strong complementarity ( > ^ ()) there are
two locally stable asymmetric interior steady states (xA
1 ;xA
2 ) and (xA0
1 ;xA0




1 > 0, xA
2 > 0 and xA
1 6= xA
2 .
3b. for a high discount rate ( > 0) and mild complementarity ( < ^ ()) there are
two unstable asymmetric interior steady states (xA
1 ;xA
2 ) and (xA0
1 ;xA0




1 > 0, xA
2 > 0 and xA
1 6= xA
2 .
Proof: see Appendix A.6. 
Combined with Lemma 1, Lemma 3 indicates that there can be multiple interior
steady states. This may come as a surprise, as the resource dynamics are given by
logistic growth equations and thus perfectly convex. The objective function, however,
depends on the stock sizes of the two resources, as the costs of harvesting resource j
depend on xj, and hence the economy may be characterized by multiple steady states
(see also [24]).9
Note that 0 is lower the higher are  and q, and the lower is ! (see 14). If several
interior steady states exist (i.e., if  > ^ () and  < 0 or if 1 <  < ^ () and  > 0),
none of them can be globally stable. This gives rise to the following proposition:
Proposition 3. 3a. for mild complements (1 <  < ^ ()) and a low discount rate
( < 0), there are three steady states, (xS;xS); (1;0) and (0;1); of which (xS;xS) is
locally stable;
9For a more general discussion of how multiple equilibria and tipping points can materialize in
concave optimization problems with one state variable, see [25].
143b. for strong complements ( > ^ ()) and a low discount rate ( < 0), there are
ve steady states, (xS;xS); (1;0), (0;1); (xA
1 ;xA
2 ) and (xA
2 ;xA





1 ) are locally stable;
3c. for mild complements (1 <  < ^ ()) and a high discount rate ( > 0), there are
ve steady states, (xS;xS); (1;0), (0;1); (xA
1 ;xA
2 ) and (xA
2 ;xA
1 ), of which (xS;xS), (1;0)
and (0;1) are locally stable;
3d. for strong complements ( > ^ ()) and a high discount rate ( > 0), there are
three steady states, (xS;xS); (1;0), (0;1); of which (1;0) and (0;1) are locally stable.
Proof: a) and d) follow from Lemma 2; b) and c) follow from Lemma 3. 
Proposition 3 states that, unlike in the case of resources being substitutes, the sym-
metric steady state is locally stable if and only if both the discount rate and the degree
of complementarity are suciently low. This is because the present value of the ben-
ets of building up the relatively small stock are larger the lower is the discount rate,
while the costs of doing so are larger the stronger the complementarity between the two
resources. Building up a stock requires reducing per-period extraction, and using little
of the relatively scarce resource implies that utility during the transition phase is quite
low { as the reduced use of the relatively scarce resource can hardly be compensated by
a more intensive use of the relatively abundant one. Therefore, the higher the degree
of complementarity, the less likely it is that society is willing to invest in building up
stocks, and the more so the more impatient it is.
Let us now look at Proposition 3 in more detail; see Figure 2.10 If the two resources
are complements ( > 1) and the discount rate is suciently small ( < 0), Proposi-
tion 3 states that there are three steady states in the system's interior (case 3b) { unless
complementarity is fairly weak (1 <  < ^ (); see case 3a). Proposition 3a is illustrated
10 In addition to the parameter values given in footnote 6, we use  = 0:09,  = 1:667 in panel (a)
of Figure 2,  = 0:09,  = 5:0 in panel (b),  = 0:17,  = 1:667 in panel (c), and  = 0:17,  = 2:5 in
panel (d).
15(a) (b)
1 <  < ^ ();  < 0
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 > ^ ();  > 0
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Figure 2: Phase diagrams for dierent degrees of complementarity  > 1 of the resources
and dierent social discount rates .
in Figure 2 (a); whatever the initial steady state stocks, society is suciently patient
to be willing to invest in building up the relatively small stock { because the degree
of complementarity is not very strong so that during the transition phase the decrease
in welfare can be kept limited by using more of the relatively abundant stock. Hence,
the symmetric steady state, S, is the only optimal steady state of the system. In case
3b, illustrated in Figure 2 (b), society is patient enough to ensure the existence of an
interior stable steady state, but this is not the symmetric steady state (S), which is
16unstable, but rather two locally stable asymmetric steady states exist, A and A0. The
high degree of complementarity between the two resources limits the attractiveness to
build up both resource stocks, and this leads to a path dependency of the economy. For
any initial relative stock size ((x1(0);x2(0)), x1(0) 6= x2(0)), the steady state stock of the
initially scarce resource is relatively small, while the steady state stock of the initially
abundant resource is relatively large. So if x1(0) < (>)x2(0), the system ends up in the
asymmetric steady state A (A'); only if x1(0) = x2(0), the system ends up in S { as
indicated by the dashed saddle path.
If the two resources are complements ( > 1) and the discount rate is suciently
large ( > 0), Proposition 3 states that there are three steady states in the system's
interior (case 3c) { unless complementarity is too strong ( > ^ (); see case 3d). Figure 2
(c) illustrates case 3c with  > 0 and 1 <  < ^ (). The two asymmetric steady states
A and A0 are saddle-point stable. The dashed lines C and C0 depict the saddle point
trajectories that would lead to these steady states. Thus, if  > 0 and 1 <  < ^ (),
the initial stocks determine which steady state is optimal { (xS;xS), (1,0), or (0,1). For
all initial states in between C and C0 the optimal paths lead to the symmetric steady
state S. For initial states to the west (south) of the saddle path C (C0), it is optimal to
continue harvesting both resources at reasonably high rates until the initially scarcest
resource is depleted in the limit t ! 1, while the initially most plentiful stock grows
logistically until it reaches, in the limit, its carrying capacity K = 1. In the limit,
the level of well-being would be minus innity (cf. the utility function (1)), but with a
suciently impatient society (condition  > 0 holds) the discount factor would tend to
zero faster than the current level of well-being would decrease.





1 ) vanish if  > 0 and  > ^ (), and moreover (xS;xS) loses its (local) stability;
see Proposition 3d and Figure 2 (d). Here, the complementarity of resources and the
rate of discount are so high that the collapse of the resource-dependent economy is
17low discount rate high discount rate
 < 0  > 0
substitutes  < 1 (xS;xS) (xS;xS)














Table 1: Summary of locally stable steady states.
optimal for almost any set of initial conditions. The only exception is the case where
the economy initially is on the saddle path to the symmetric steady state, i.e. where
x1(0) = x2(0) holds exactly. So, if society starts harvesting in the Garden of Eden
(where both x1(0) and x2(0) are equal to 1 { their maximum levels), the symmetric
steady state may eventually be reached { but only if neither of the two resources are hit
by even the tiniest shock.
We summarize all results in Table 1. If resources are substitutes ( < 1) and if
resource j is relatively abundant (xj(0)=x j(0) is relatively large), the costs of building
up resource  j are relatively small because the reduced use of resource  j can at least
partly be compensated by a more intensive use of resource j. Indeed, we nd that
the welfare costs associated with system restoration in the transition phase are always
smaller than the net present value of the benets of eventually having x1 = x2 = xS
{ that is, for the relevant case where maxf2r!    q;r q   ( q   2r!)g > 0; see
Lemma 1.11 If the resources are complements ( > 1); it may still be optimal to build
up the relatively scarce resource stock towards its symmetric steady state level xS, but
11Note that this holds a fortiori if minfr!  q;MSY g > 0 also holds, because then the symmetric
steady state is interior as well as locally stable for all values of  anyway { see Proposition 1.
18not if the degree of complementarity is too high (that is, if  > ^ ()). For high levels
of complementarity the economy tends towards asymmetric steady states, which are
located in the interior if and only if the benets of partially building up the relatively
scarce resource are suciently high { that is, if the discount rate is suciently low.
Before we turn to the analyzing the economy's resilience in more detail, it is impor-
tant to note that the conditions on  and  (cf. 14 and 16) are not independent { as
already suggested in footnote 8. The following lemma characterizes this relationship in
more detail.
Lemma 4. ^ () is monotonically decreasing from ^ (MSY) = +1 to lim
!1
^ () =  q=(2( q 
r!))   > 1.
Proof: see Appendix A.5. 
The properties of ^ () are illustrated in Figure 3.12 Lemma 4 states that ^  is de-
creasing in : for any given  > 1, the higher the discount rate, the more likely it is
that two resources are being labeled `strong complements', and hence the less likely it
is that society is willing to invest in building up the initially relatively scarce one.
Lemma 4 thus implies an alternative denition for `mild' and `strong' complemen-
tarity. Using ^  to denote the level of the discount rate that implicitly solves ^ () = ,
resources with a degree of complementarity equal to  are dened to be mild (strong)
complements if  < ^ () ( > ^ ()). Hence, in reference to Table 1, we can identify four
regimes for  > 1 where Regime I is the case of low discount rates ( < 0) combined
with mild complementarity ( < ^ ()), Regime IV is the case of high discount rates and
strong complementarity ( > 0 and  > ^ ()), etc. So, for (xS;xS) to be stable for a
pair of resources with degree of complementarity equal to  (that is, for Regimes I or
II to apply), the discount rate should be smaller than ^ () (so that the resources are
12 In addition to the parameter values given in footnote 6, we use A = 5:0 and B = 1:667 in
Figure 3 as well as in Figure 4 below.
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Figure 3: Threshold degree of complementarity as a function of the social discount rate
(for  > MSY).
mild complements;  < ^ ()). Furthermore, the corner steady states (1;0) and (0;1)
are stable for  > 0 (Regimes II and IV) and unstable for  < 0 (Regimes I and III).
Hence, Regime I applies if  < minf0; ^ ()g. Regarding the issue of which of the two
conditions ( < 0, or  < ^ ) is more stringent, let us denote with ? the value of  for
which the conditions (14) and (16) coincide.13 This is represented in Figure 3 as follows.
For a specic level  = A > ?, ^ (A) < 0, while for  = B < ?, ^ (B) > 0. That
is, dening ? = ^ (0), we have ^  > 0 (^  < 0) for all  < ? ( > ?).
4.3 Bifurcation diagrams
Having established the dynamics of the resource stocks for various levels of  and  > 1,
let us now turn to the question how these two key parameters aect the economy's
resilience. Suppose that the economy is in steady state and that it is hit by an exogenous
13 Note that this value ? exists and is unique, as 0 > MSY (recall that  q > r!; see Condition 1).
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Figure 4: Bifurcation diagrams: steady state stock sizes as function of discount rate
for (a) mild and (b) strong complements. Red solid lines depict an (almost) globally
stable equilibrium, magenta dotted lines locally stable equilibria and blue dashed lines
(almost) unstable equilibria. Roman numbers I{IV refer to the regimes identied in
Table 1.
shock, does the economy return to its original steady state? In Figure 4 we depict the
steady states of the economy as a function of  (with  > 1). In Figure 4(a)  is
suciently close to 1 that we have 0 < ^ () (that is,  < ?), while Figure 4(b)
is drawn for a larger  such that ^ () < 0 (i.e.,  > ?): The bifurcation diagrams
summarize the resilience properties of the various cases as identied in Proposition 3,
and Roman numbers I-IV indicate the regime the economy is in, where the regimes are
dened in Table 1; see also Figure 3.
Figure 4(a) shows how the stability properties depend on the discount rate for  < ?
so that 0 < ^ : At low levels of  ( < minf0; ^ g), the economy is in Regime I, so there
is just one optimal steady state. This steady state is globally stable, and hence the
economy will return to it as long as the exogenous shock perturbing the system does not
directly exhaust any of the two resources. For larger  such that 0 <  < ^ ; consumers
are more impatient or society's institutions are of limited permanence ( > 0), but
given the actual degree of complementarity (), the discount rate is still suciently
21small ( < ^ ) that the resources can still be labeled mild complements (1 <  < ^ ()).
That means that the economy is in Regime II, and the relevant phase diagram is now
Figure 2(c). Hence, there are three interior steady states, two of which are unstable
(A and A0, depicted as the upper and lower branches in Figure 4(a)), and one locally
stable one (S, in the middle between A and A0). If a shock moves the system outside
the region bounded by the unstable equilibria A and A0, it is optimal for society to
ultimately deplete one of the resources because the (instantaneous) costs of regenerating
the scarcest resource are smaller than the benets. Finally, for even higher levels of 
such that  > ^ , the discount rate is suciently high that the resources can now be
labeled strong complements (see Regime IV) and hence the economy loses its resilience
altogether { the basin of attraction for S has shrunk to zero, as it has become an
unstable steady state itself. The relevant phase diagram is now Figure 2 (d): the two
saddle-point stable branches disappear, and any shock, however small, will result in the
ultimate depletion of one of the resources.
Figure 4(b) is drawn for  > ? so that ^  < 0. For discount rates close to 0 (so that
 < minf^ ;0g), the symmetric steady state is globally optimal, and the economy is in
Regime I. For levels of  such that ^  <  < 0, the discount rate itself is still `low', but
it is suciently high that the resources can now be labeled `strong complements'. That
means that the economy is in Regime II, and the relevant phase diagram is Figure 2(b):
the two asymmetric interior steady states are locally stable. And if the discount rate
is even higher (that is,  > 0 > ^ ), the economy is in Regime IV, and only the corner
steady states are stable.
225 Optimal resilience management of the resource-
dependent economy
In section 4 we have studied the (multiple) steady states and path dependence of the
optimally managed resource-dependent economy, answering the question whether, for
given ;  and all other parameters of the economy, society is willing to invest in building
up the initially relatively scarce resource, yes or no, for specic levels (and ratios) of
x1(0) and x2(0). Clearly, this is relevant in itself, but it also provides the necessary
input for the analysis of the optimal management of the resource-dependent economy
(see also [16] for a similar analysis). If a shock to the economy results in a specic ratio
of x1=x2 6= 1, is it optimal for society to bring the economy back to the state where
x1 = x2 = xS, or not?
In this section we build on the previous two sections' results to analyze the con-
sequences a one-time random shock  = (1;2) hitting the resource stocks at time
T, such that the stock variables shift from the current state (x1(T);x2(T)) to another,
disturbed state (x1(T +dt);x2(T +dt)) = (x1(T) 1;x2(T) 2) an innitesimal time
increment dt later. The random shock  is distributed over some bounded support 
.
After such a disturbance, the social planner re-optimizes its harvesting and production
plans to maximize (6) given the post-shock stock sizes (and taking into account equa-
tions (1){(5)). We will focus on parameter values where  > 1 and the economy is in
Regime II, as this is the most interesting case with one stable steady state with positive
stock sizes (the symmetric steady state (xS;xS)) and two stable steady states where one
stock is depleted (the corners (0;1) and (1;0)); see Figure 2(c).
The social planner's optimization problem at time t = 0 before the resource stocks






  t dt + e
  T E fV (x1(T)   1;x2(T)   2)g (17)
23subject to (2){(5) and using (x1(0);x2(0)) = (xS;xS) as initial stocks. We use E to
denote the expectation operator over the random disturbance at time T. Furthermore,
the value function V (x1;x2) is dened as





  t dt (18)
subject to (2){(5) with initial state (x1;x2)
The rst-order conditions that determine the optimal development of the economy
before the shock are identical to those given in Appendix A.1, except for the transver-
sality conditions at T. These transversality conditions require that the shadow price j
of resource stock j = 1;2 must equal the expected marginal value of the stock after T,
i.e. j(T) = EfVxj(x1(T)   1;x2(T)   2)g.
We numerically study the optimal development of the economy before the shock
assuming  = 0:17, and for two dierent degrees of complementarity,  = 1:5 and  =
1:8. Given the other parameter values as specied in footnote 6, we have 1 <  < ^ ()
and  > 0 for both values of , and hence the economy is in Regime II as identied
in Table 1. The corresponding phase diagrams are drawn in Figure 5(a) and (b). For
initial states to the west (south) of the saddle path C (C0), it is optimal to continue
harvesting both resources at reasonably high rates until the initially scarcest resource
is depleted in the limit t ! 1, while the initially most plentiful stock grows until it
reaches, in the limit, its carrying capacity K = 1. The range of post-shock values of x1
and x2 for which (0,1) or (1,0) are optimal, is clearly larger for  = 1:8 than for  = 1:5.
So how does this dierence in resilience aect the society's optimal management plans?
We proceed as follows. First, we numerically compute the value function V (x1;x2)
using the collocation method for solving the Bellman equation corresponding to the
planner's optimization problem [26].14 The resulting value functions are shown in Fig-
14 Programming codes are available from the authors. We use Matlab (version 7.11.0) with the Comp-








































































































































































Figure 5: Phase diagrams (top), value functions (middle), and optimal paths of resource
stocks before a shock at time T = 100 (bottom) for a degree of complementarity of
 = 1:5 (left) and  = 1:8 (right).
25ure 5(c) and (d). They are smooth over the whole domain. We further assume that
the economy initially is in the symmetric steady state (xS;xS). At time T = 100, the
stock of resource 1 is reduced by 1 = 0:25 with probability p = 0:5, while there is no
shock to the stock of resource 2 (2 = 0 with probability p = 1). Next, we derive the
optimal time path before the shock by numerically solving the open-loop optimization
problem (17), using the previously computed value function V (x1;x2) to determine the
appropriate transversality conditions.15 The resulting time paths for the two resource
stocks are shown in Figure 5(e) and (f).
Consistent with intuition, the optimal stock size of resource 1 increases over time
to insure against the potential shock at T = 100. To increase the stock of resource 1,
harvest has to be reduced. As a consequence, harvest of the complementary resource 2
decreases as well, and the stock of resource 2 also increases. Still, two additional results
are surprising. First, the anticipated eect of the shock starts aecting the optimal
management plan only a relatively short period before the negative shock hits (with
a 50% probability) at time T = 100; for t / 75, the optimal steady state is still the
symmetric steady state (xS;xS). Second, the optimal trajectories of x1 are very similar
for the two values of . The considerably lower resilience of the economy for  = 1:8
has hardly any inuence on optimal management before a shock hits the economy.
These results are surprising, especially because Polasky et al. [16] conclude that
the impact on optimal management of the probability of a regime shift can be quite
substantial. However, our paper diers from theirs in that we focus on the role of
consumer preferences regarding two resources, whereas Polasky et al. analyze the case
where a negative disturbance aects the parameters of the growth function of a specic
resource. In their analysis, the system switching to a bad state reduces the prots of
of degree 70 in the domain [0:01;0:99]  [0:01;0:99]. Approximation residuals are below 10 7 over the
whole domain.
15We use Matlab's built in solver for boundary value problems, bvp5c.
26resource harvesting substantially, and hence it pays to invest to prevent the system ip
taking place. In our case, however, the benets of preventing collapse are increasing in
the extent to which society is dependent on resource conservation, but so are the costs
of preventing collapse. If the degree of complementarity is large (small), the benets of
preventing the resources to jump into the basin of attraction of the bad equilibria are
large (small), but the costs of doing so (in terms of reduced instantaneous welfare) are
large (small) too.
For illustration, we also compute the optimal path of the economy for an initial state
(x1(T) 1;x2(T)), using the closed-loop solution to the optimization problem given by
the value function. The resulting trajectories are also shown in Figure 5(a) and (b). For
the lower degree of complementarity,  = 1:5, the symmetric steady state is ultimately
approached again after the shock. For the higher degree of complementarity,  = 1:8,
by contrast, the optimal steady state after the shock is the corner steady state (0;1).
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed how consumer preferences aect the resilience of optimally
managed, natural-resource-dependent economies. We focused on two characteristics of
preferences, the degree of complementarity of resources in the satisfaction of human
needs, and the social discount rate. We derived conditions on the degree of complemen-
tarity and on the discount rate for which the optimal dynamics of resource use features
multiple optimal steady states and path dependence. We did so assuming symmetric
resources { there are two dierent stocks, but they share the same biological character-
istics. In this setting, we established that if parameters are such that the symmetric
steady state stocks are larger than the maximum sustainable yield ones, this symmetric
steady state is always stable, independent of whether the two resources are substitutes
in consumption, or complements. If the symmetric steady state stocks are positive but
27smaller than the maximum sustainable yield levels (the more relevant case), the degree
of complementarity crucially aects the stability of the symmetric steady state.
The results are surprising. While one may expect that society is more willing to
invest in regenerating relatively scarce resources if they are complements in consumption
than if they are substitutes, we nd the exact opposite. If resources are substitutes in
consumption, the optimally managed economy always ends up in the symmetric steady
state { independent of the initial stocks. If resources are complements in consumption,
however, the economy is characterized by limited resilience; alternative steady states
exist that are locally stable, and the symmetric steady state may even become unstable
{ if the discount rate is suciently high. The intuition behind these results is the
following. Regeneration of the relatively small stock requires reducing the rate at which
it is being harvested. Such a reduction reduces instantaneous welfare, but more so if the
two resources are complements in consumption than if they are substitutes { the higher
the degree of complementarity, the less feasible it is to compensate the reduced use of
one resource by increased use of the other. Hence, the benets of moving the system to
its symmetric steady state are larger the higher the degree of complementarity, but so
are its costs. And if society is suciently impatient, it may even be optimal to always
deplete the initially least abundant resource.
So, we nd that society's willingness to invest in regenerating stocks is smaller the
stronger the complementarity between the two resources, and hence one would expect
that anticipating this, society would be willing to apply more stringent `safe minimum
standards' in the face of a random shock if it considers resources to be complements
rather than substitutes. Surprisingly, and in contrast to [16], we nd very little evidence
for this; in anticipation of negative shocks society is willing to invest in larger stocks
to better buer the economy against them, but numerical analyses suggest that this
willingness is not very sensitive to the degree of complementarity. Again, the benets of
investing in greater stocks are larger the more dependent society is on these resources,
28but the costs of building up stocks are larger too. The higher the degree of comple-
mentarity, the smaller the basin of attraction of the symmetric steady state, but the
propensity to invest in larger buers is not much greater.
Modern societies are admittedly more complex than the one in our model, if only
because they exploit more than two resources. These resources may be pairwise com-
plements, or substitutes. The higher the level of aggregation of the analysis (e.g., at
the ecosystem level or even at the level of the Earth's climate system), the higher the
degree of complementarity tends to be. This paper shows that the fact that society is
more dependent on the conservation of the higher-level resources such as clean drinking
water, fertile soil, or the Earth's climate system, does not necessarily guarantee their
sustainable use.
Appendix
A.1 Conditions for optimal resource use























j [fj(xj)   hj] (19)
where j is the shadow price of the resource stock j; j = 1;2. The rst-order conditions
























j   _ j j = 1;2 (21)
together with the transversality conditions e  t j xj
t!1       ! 0 and for given initial sizes
of the resource stocks xj(0) = xj0 for j = 1;2. For the following analysis, it is more con-
venient to use the shadow price of resource consumption, j (as dened in Equation 20)
than the shadow price of the resource stock, j.


















qj xj hj 
P
j=1;2 j hj =  < !, where the last inequality holds
by assumption.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
In a symmetric steady state xS
1 = xS
2 = xS, which implies that S
1 = S
2 = S; see (10).
From (9) we infer that xS is implicitly determined by 2Sf(xS) = . Using (10) and (5),
this condition can be rewritten as

2rx










Solving for xS yields the unique positive solution given in Equation (13) provided











,  ( q   2r!) <  q r:
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
(i) We will use in the following that 0(xS) < 0. To prove this, note rst that any real-
valued solution to (9) requires that j, j = 1;2 is positive, which means that  > f0(xj)








2 +  (   r + 4rxj)
x2
j (   r + 2rxj)
2 < 0
as xj > (r   )=(2r). In a similar way, it is easily veried that 00
j(xj) > 0.
30(ii) We now analyze the local stability of the symmetric steady state by considering
the Jacobian matrix of the dynamic system (7) and (8). Using 2S f(xS) = , in
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where xS is stock size and (xS) is the shadow price of harvest in the symmetric steady

























f(xS) (   f0(xS))
#
: (25)
All four eigenvalues are real valued, as (xS) > 0, f(xS) > 0, 0(xS) < 0, and  > f0(xS).
It follows directly that 1 > 0 and 3 > 0. (xS;xS) is always stable (independent of )









































If xS > 1=2  xMSY, we have f0(xS) < 0, so that conditions (26) and (27) are always
met.
(iii) The stock sizes in the symmetric steady state are larger than the maximum
31sustainable yield stocks xMSY = 1=2 if and only if
































which holds if either  q < r! or  < r2 !=(2 ( q   r!))  MSY.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
We shall rst show that for  < 1 we have x0
j(xi) > 0 for all xi. Total dierentiation

































The rst term on the right hand side is negative because 0
i(xi) < 0 (cf. Appendix A.3)
and because  > i f(xi); see (9). The last factor (in brackets) of the second term on









2 +  [   r + 4rxi]
[ + rxi] [   r + 2rxi]
+
1   2xi
xi [1   xi]
=  
 [ + 2rxi] + r2 [1   2xi [1   xi]]
[1   xi] [ + rxi] [   r + 2rxi]
< 0: (29)
We use this to show that for  < 1 any steady state must be symmetric. Let (x1;x2) =
(xS;xS) be a symmetric steady state. Since xj(xi) is monotonically increasing, it may
be inverted, such that a steady state is determined by x2(xS) = x
 1
1 (xS). For symmetric
resources, we have x2(x) = x1(x) for all x. Assume without loss of generality that
x0
j(xS) > 1. Then, x0
i(xS) = 1=x0
j(xS) < 1. Thus, no asymmetric steady state is possible.
Furthermore, only one symmetric steady state with xS > 0 exists (Lemma 1).
For  < 1, the problem is also well-dened if one of the resource stocks is zero
from the very beginning. In this case, the rst-order conditions for the optimal the


































Solving for xA leads to (15). It is straightforward to verify that this steady state is at a
positive stock level if (14) holds.
A.5 Proofs of Lemmas 2 and 4
By Condition 1, we have f0(xS) > 0. With this, the eigenvalue 4 of the Jacobian at
the symmetric steady state (see Appendix A.3) is negative if  < ^ () and positive if
 > ^ (), as is easily veried using (26).
Next, we show that ^  is monotonically decreasing with  and that ^ () > 1. This
shows that the eigenvalue 2 of the Jacobian at the symmetric steady state (see Ap-
pendix A.3) is always negative. Hence, the symmetric steady state is stable if  < ^ ()
and unstable if  > ^ ().
As f0(xS)
!MSY           ! 0, we have ^ ()
&MSY           ! +1. By dierentiating (16) with respect
to  for  > MSY (Condition 1), we obtain
^ 
















which is negative, as dxS=d < 0 (cf. Lemma 1); (xS) > 0, 0(xS) < 0, and 00(xS) > 0
(cf. Appendix A.4); and as f(xS) > 0, f0(xS) > 0 (because  > MSY) and f00(xS) < 0.
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2(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 q   (2r!    q)
> 1:
33A.6 Proof of Lemma 3
We shall consider the xj(xi) isoclines, as given by Equations (11) and (12). With
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First, from Equation (33) we have j(xi)
xi!1       ! +1 and hence xj(xi)
xi!1       ! 0 from
Equation (32).
We shall secondly show that for  > 0 we have xj(xi)
xi&0
      ! 0, while for  < 0
a xi > 0 exists such that xj(xi)
xi&xi       ! +1. Consider the expression in brackets in


















 xi > 0:
Hence, j(xi) = 0 and xj(xi)
xi&xi       ! +1 by Equation (32).
For  > 0, the expression in brackets in Equation (33) is positive even for xi = 0.
Thus, j(xi)
xi&0
      != +1 and xj(xi)
xi&0
      ! 0 by Equation (32).
These two arguments together imply that for  > 0, we have x2(x1(x)) < x for x
suciently close to 1, while for  < 0, we have x2(x1(x)) > x for x suciently close
to 1.
Third, for  < ^ () the symmetric steady state is locally stable (Lemma 2) which
implies that x2(x1(xS + )) > xS +  for some small  > 0 (put dierently, we have
x0
j(xS) <  1). For  > ^ () the symmetric steady state is locally unstable (Lemma 2)
which implies that x2(x1(xS+)) < xS+ for some small  > 0 (put dierently, we have
x0
j(xS) >  1).
Now for 3a), we have x2(x1(xS+)) < xS+ for some small  > 0 and x2(x1(x)) > x for
some x suciently close to 1. Since x2(x2()) is continuous, the equation x2(x1(xA)) = xA
34must have a solution xA > xS. As the symmetric steady state is unstable, the asymmetric
steady states are stable [24].
As for 3b), we have x2(x1(xS+)) > xS+ for some small  > 0 and x2(x1(x)) < x for
some x suciently close to 1. Since x2(x2()) is continuous, the equation x2(x1(xA)) = xA
must have a solution xA > xS. As the symmetric steady state is stable, the asymmetric
steady states are unstable [24].
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